

**The Choice Between Intergovernmentalism and Nongovernmentalism:
Projecting Domestic Preferences to Global Governance**

by ALEXANDRU GRIGORESCU and CAGLAYAN BASER*

This study seeks to explain when governments are more likely to take an intergovernmental approach to resolving global collective problems rather than step back and encourage (or simply allow) nongovernmental actors to become the main “global governors.” We suggest that among the most important factors driving this choice are the domestic ideological leanings of powerful states towards greater or lesser government activism. Such ideologies connect domestic preferences to international ones. They also lead to the establishment of domestic institutions that, in turn, facilitate the emergence of international organizations. Our arguments lead us to develop a set of inferences regarding the likelihood that governments 1) establish and 2) join intergovernmental organizations. We test our hypotheses through a study of global governance in the education realm as well as through a series of statistical analyses covering developments in all issue-areas over the last century and a half. The tests offer support for our arguments.

* A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association March 16-19, 2016 in Atlanta, Georgia. The authors would like to thank Ekrem Baser, Elizabeth Bloodgood, Thomas Davies, Claudio Katz, Robert Keohane, Vincent Mahler, Molly Melin, Charles Roger, and Peter Willetts for their helpful comments. Kimberly Loontjer and Paul Olander provided valuable research assistance.

Replication code for this article is available at Grigorescu and Baser 2018a.

Intergovernmentalism in global governance

In April 1919, representatives of the victorious powers of World War I met in Cannes, to establish the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), an international nongovernmental organization (INGO), rather than an intergovernmental organization (IGO), to deal with international health concerns in times of peace. A few months later the new League of Nations requested the LRCS take the lead in dealing with a typhus epidemic spreading through Europe, rather than establish a health organization as part of its intergovernmental structures or turn to the International Office of Public Health, an IGO that existed since 1907.¹ Yet, in 1923, governments established the League Health Organization (LHO), replacing the LRCS as the leading organization dealing with epidemics and, more broadly, as the main “global governor”² in the health realm. By the 1930s, the global economic crisis led League member-states to reduce LHO funding, personnel and activities substantially. In fact, the LHO probably would have been shut down, had it not been for the nongovernmental Rockefeller Foundation financing about half of its work. After World War II, the World Health Organization (WHO), an IGO, became the clear leader in global health, albeit one intended to work alongside other actors, “orchestrating” international efforts.³ However, observers recently noted WHO’s increasing “irrelevance” and the empowerment of nongovernmental actors, especially the Gates Foundation.⁴ The foundation supports IGOs such as WHO, but also INGOs and private-public initiatives (such as the Global Forum for Health Research - GFHR). Currently, almost half the global health funding comes from nongovernmental rather than government sources.⁵

Other issue-areas exhibit similar variation across time in the degree to which global governance has been more intergovernmental or nongovernmental in nature. This study seeks to explain such variation. We primarily focus on governments’ decisions to establish IGOs to

resolve global problems, rather than step back and allow or encourage nongovernmental actors such as INGOs, philanthropic foundations, and private businesses to take the lead. These decisions are the most meaningful manifestations of “intergovernmentalism.” Additionally, we consider governments’ decisions to join IGOs, to assess whether our arguments can be extended to other manifestations of intergovernmentalism.

We regard states’ decisions of becoming involved in global governance through IGOs as purposeful choices. Existing literature has long focused on the important choice between multilateralism and unilateralism. This decision has been framed primarily in the context of governments’ abilities to cooperate with one another.⁶ We complement this literature with a discussion of a second choice, one between intergovernmental and nongovernmental approaches to global governance. This additional choice of whether states *want to* become involved in global governance of an issue-area, precedes the ubiquitous one of whether they *can* cooperate to establish IGOs.

Intergovernmentalism refers to governments acting together to tackle collective problems. Nongovernmentalism is a broader term, subsuming all other possible options for resolving such problems when the main global governors are not governments or IGOs. Nongovernmentalism thus has more possible manifestations than intergovernmentalism.

First, nongovernmentalism can take different forms depending on the types of actors that become involved in global governance. Indeed, in the example of the global health realm, there were times when INGOs (such as the LRCS), private foundations (as the Rockefeller or Gates foundations) or public-private partnerships (such as the GFHR) played important roles. Despite the differences between these types of actors, we consider that all such nongovernmental entities can be treated as being fairly similar by governmental actors. When activist governments decide

to play a more meaningful role in global governance they may “crowd out” one or more types of nongovernmental actors, pushing the system towards intergovernmentalism. Alternatively, when governments do not act, or when they encourage others to act, the system shifts away from intergovernmentalism, regardless of the types of nongovernmental actors that end up playing a greater role in global governance.

Second, there are differences across the various forms of nongovernmentalism that are determined by the degree to which governmental actors play greater or smaller roles in resolving collective problems. On the one hand, there are instances where governments simply do not act, leaving room for nongovernmental actors to fill the void left in global governance and being indifferent to whether a nongovernmental solution is adopted and to what that solution may be. On the other hand, there are instances where governments take complete control of an issue-area, without allowing any nongovernmental actors to play any role. Most cases, however, fall somewhere on a continuum between these two extremes, of pure “government passivism” or “government activism.” For instance, governmental actors can actively seek hybrid intergovernmental-nongovernmental solutions, such as those in which IGOs orchestrate the work of nongovernmental actors, or can launch public-private partnerships.⁷ Governments can also directly encourage the adoption of a specific nongovernmental solution.

We should point out that the nongovernmental nature of global governance will not only depend on whether governments allow or encourage nongovernmental actors to play a more prominent role, but also whether such actors accept to play this role. The choice nongovernmental actors face is, of course, an important one. However, we consider that in order to fully explain its complexities requires a separate comprehensive study. We therefore limit the present article to the study of governments’ choices to take on global issues through IGOs or to

leave the tasks of global governance to nongovernmental actors. We assume that when they take a more hands-on approach to global issues the system will likely shift towards intergovernmentalism and when they take a more hands-off approach global governance is likely to become more nongovernmental.

Our work not only complements the broad body of literature on questions of intergovernmental cooperation and multilateralism but also the one explaining the *current* increasing role of nongovernmental actors in global governance, whether acting independently or through orchestration.⁸ Some of this literature addresses similar questions as ours, by emphasizing differences between intergovernmental and nongovernmental initiatives (such as the higher “entry costs” of formal IGOs compared to those of flexible nongovernmental actors)⁹ or those between states (in terms of political freedoms and decentralization).¹⁰

While accepting such arguments, we suggest that governments’ decisions to establish and join IGOs (the main focus of this study) are in great part the result of powerful states projecting domestic preference to global governance. Specifically, we argue that when governments adopt a more activist approach to domestic issues, they are likely to promote a more hands-on (intergovernmental) approach to global governance. When they take a passive approach domestically, they are likely to accept or promote nongovernmental global solutions. While some have used similar arguments to explain connections between U.S. New Deal domestic activism and the establishment of global IGOs after World War II,¹¹ this study extends this logic across 1) time, 2) states, and 3) types of government preferences. More broadly, our historical approach complements recent literature by putting the apparently linear trends of the past decades in a broader perspective, and instead suggesting the presence of cyclical dynamics (as in the example of global health).

After offering some prima facie evidence of the connections between domestic government activism and intergovernmentalism in the case of the U.S. (an actor that played a major role in shaping global governance during most of the period we investigate), we proceed to explain the mechanisms behind such connections. We build on existing literature to tease out two possible mechanisms: one ideology-based and a second institutions-based. We then discuss the aggregation of government interests in forging a more or less intergovernmental form of global governance. The following sections test our main arguments. We first consider the case of global governance in education. The case study is then complemented by statistical analyses of states establishing and joining IGOs over the past century and a half. The results of these tests support our main arguments. We conclude with a discussion of the relevance of our findings.

Projecting domestic activism to global governance: initial evidence from U.S. policies

An essential question facing all domestic political systems is the degree to which governments should involve themselves in resolving collective problems. Governments, of course, are not the only actors that can deal with such problems. The literature has discussed the government sector as one of three existing domestic sectors (alongside the business and voluntary non-profit sectors).¹² Based on such an understanding, when governments take on a more active role, nongovernmental entities from one or both of the other two sectors, whether markets, NGOs, private foundations, or hybrid private-public entities, are crowded out of the governance process.

Government activism can be the result of various ideologies, such as statism or authoritarianism. Conversely, when governments adopt a passive approach to governance one or both of the other two sectors may gain greater roles. Passivism is often purposeful and associated

with ideologies such as those of laissez-faire or democratic pluralism. A laissez-faire ideology promotes a greater role for the private sector while democratic pluralism promotes a greater role for the voluntary nonprofit sector. What these two ideologies have in common is that they both call for governments playing a smaller role and for nongovernmental actors playing a greater one.

Of course, we should point out that the various ideologies supporting either activism or passivism do not always go hand in hand. There have been a number of authoritarian states that encouraged laissez-faire economic policies. Also, governments of democratic states have often embraced ideologies calling for greater state intervention in economic affairs. Individually, however, each of these ideologies have shaped government decisions of whether and how much they should intervene in resolving domestic problems and are therefore relevant for this study.

The question of government activism was raised at different times across many issues. Around the turn of the twentieth century progressives and socialists in the U.S., U.K., France, and Germany argued for an expanded role of governments to include social questions such as health care and labor.¹³ The role of governments expanded dramatically in the 1930s, in response to worldwide depression. New Deal policies were followed by even further expansion of government roles during the Cold War, leading to the emergence of the welfare state across the developed world.

The trend towards active governments has not been continuous. The fall of communism in the late 1980s led to a retrenchment of government role in former Soviet Bloc states. Earlier, the Progressive and New Deal eras were followed by periods of reversals of activism. Perhaps most important, throughout the 1980s many states, led by the U.S. and U.K., encouraged deregulation and privatization of public services. Although state retrenchment has not been as

acute after the Cold War, scholars note that areas of “ungovernance” have continued to be purposefully left open for non-state actors.¹⁴

U.S. policies illustrate that domestic government activism often goes hand in hand with support for intergovernmentalism. Indeed, although by today’s standards U.S. government activism immediately prior to World War I was considerably lower than after World War II, the domestic legislation adopted by progressives was considered groundbreaking at that time.¹⁵ Soon after such domestic changes, the Wilson Administration also led efforts to establish a strong role for IGOs to take on issue-areas previously controlled by nongovernmental entities. For example, Wilson supported replacing the nongovernmental International Association for Labor Legislation with the intergovernmental (or hybrid) International Labor Organization (ILO).

Soon after World War I, while U.S. domestic government activism was rolled back (during Harding’s “return to normalcy”), American intergovernmentalism was also eroded, most visibly by the Senate’s decision to not ratify U.S. membership in the League. Throughout the 1920s American nongovernmental actors such as the American Red Cross and the Rockefeller Foundation, were more active in global governance than the U.S. government.¹⁶

Similarly, the Roosevelt Administration that implemented New Deal policies domestically throughout the 1930s embraced intergovernmentalism even before World War II, when it became active in IGOs such as the ILO (which it joined in 1934) and even in the League itself, where it supported the Bruce Committee that assessed the IGO’s potential role in global economic and social issues.¹⁷ U.S. intergovernmentalism became stronger after World War II. For example, in 1945 the U.S. promoted the establishment of WHO. At home, Roosevelt had supported the 1943 Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill that sought to institute national medical and hospitalization programs.

After Roosevelt's death and Republicans gaining control of Congress in 1946, U.S. domestic government activism was once more pushed back. In the international realm there was a decline in U.S. support for new IGOs and for the use of existing ones as part of its foreign policies. In fact, the U.S. even hesitated joining the WHO that it had helped establish.¹⁸

U.S. domestic government activism increased substantially throughout the 1960s and 1970s (as reflected in the ratio between federal spending and GDP creeping up¹⁹). Support for intergovernmentalism was also high. The U.S. backed the establishment of new IGOs, such as the International Energy Agency in 1973, and the empowerment of others, as in the case of the World Bank during McNamara's presidency.

However, during the Reagan years, the U.S. began rolling back the role of government domestically, while simultaneously moving away from intergovernmentalism in global governance. It opposed establishing new IGOs²⁰ and even left some existing ones.²¹ For example at the 1981 UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, the Reagan Administration refused to back a new international agency funded solely by governments, preferring instead a more nongovernmental approach based on public-private funding.²² The intergovernmental International Renewable Energy Agency was only established in 2009, when the U.S. was more supportive of government activism.

After the end of the Cold War, American domestic government activism remained relatively low. At the same time, at the global level, the U.S. often promoted policies that purposefully left issue-areas free of intergovernmental intervention, albeit not as often as in the 1980s.²³ Nongovernmental actors (such as the International Accounting Standards Board or the Forest Stewardship Council) took on global issues that could have been handed to IGOs.²⁴

Similar parallel trends between domestic activism and intergovernmentalism can be

observed in other states, such as the U.K. and U.S.S.R./Russia. How can we explain the apparent connections between such domestic and global developments?

Explaining the domestic-international connections

We posit that there are two important mechanisms linking domestic government activism to intergovernmentalism. The first is based on the connections that ideologies generate across the domestic-international divide. The second focuses on the impact that domestic institutions have on states' abilities and interests to adopt intergovernmental solutions.

The literature has long emphasized that ideologies should be understood as coherent sets of ideas. While belief systems held by individuals can be logically contradictory, ideologies "cluster" some beliefs together. This need for clustering gives ideological approaches their rigid character, constraining an individual's beliefs and actions. The literature points out that, in contrast, pragmatism implies choosing belief systems that work best in a given situation, regardless of whether they come together or not.²⁵ An important aspect of ideologies is that they generally characterize beliefs of narrow groups within society, usually political elites.²⁶

This understanding of ideologies has several important implications for our study. First, the ideologies promoted by states are likely to shift when governing elites change. Second, and related to the first point, we expect ideologies to be relevant for top elites, rather than for lower level bureaucrats that remain in position even when governments change. Moreover, top-level elites are more likely to exhibit ideological preferences because they decide on policies in multiple issue-areas (where such consistency is important).

Most important, we expect ideologies to not only constrain beliefs (and actions) across issue-areas but also across the domestic-international divide. Specifically, we expect that when

ideologies prescribe domestic government activism, top officials also are inclined to promote intergovernmentalism in global governance.²⁷ Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech, considered one of the first steps towards American global engagement in World War II and beyond, offers an example of activism "spilling over," from U.S. domestic policies to foreign policies. In other words, ideologies responsible for governments stepping in to take domestic action also pressure them to take international action for resolving global problems.

Conversely, when governments embrace ideologies of limited government domestically, they are unlikely to support new intergovernmental bureaucracies in the international realm. For example, in 1988 Margaret Thatcher argued against powerful European institutions stating that: "We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level."²⁸

There are several reasons why ideologies may constrain elites to connect international beliefs to domestic ones regarding government activism. First, such individuals may simply seek consistency in their own personal beliefs to avoid cognitive dissonance.²⁹ It is difficult for some political leaders to accept having their own government take on a domestic problem but then not consider the fate of individuals facing similar problems in other countries. Even when elites do not personally feel such need for consistency, they may promote similar policies at the domestic and international levels because otherwise they expect domestic (and even international) audiences to question their sincerity. For instance, it would be difficult for a top government official to promote a greater role for NGOs domestically but oppose it at the global level. Such visible discrepancies may weaken the ideology itself and, implicitly, existing arguments backing important government policies. As the literature implies, we expect such ideologically-induced linkages between domestic and international beliefs to be presented by elites in normative terms

rather than in pragmatic ways.

A second explanation for the domestic-international linkages is institutional in nature. Specifically, we suggest that states are more likely to seek intergovernmental solutions to global problems after establishing or empowering institutions dealing with similar domestic problems. Such institutions come with bureaucracies that develop the necessary expertise and vested interests to establish and join IGOs. For example, one of the most important factors leading to the ILO's founding, was that powerful countries had recently established labor ministries (in 1906 in France, in 1913 in the U.S., and in 1916 in the U.K.). In 1918 officials from these institutions initiated discussions for establishing the ILO.

The main actors responsible for such domestic-international institutional linkages are officials from domestic specialized offices representing their countries in international forums. The literature considers that, when given the opportunity, such individuals promote not only their state's interests, but also their own organizational interests.³⁰ Organizations, in turn, have long been viewed as rational goal-oriented actors. Most importantly they seek survival and growth.³¹ Growth is especially pertinent in the early stages of the institution, before it reaches the "survival threshold," where it is large enough to have developed routinized relationships with major clients. A few years after the institution is created, growth slows down as many "entrepreneurial" individuals responsible for establishing it leave for more dynamic environments.³² However, even in later stages, the institution has incentives for expanding its work to gain material resources and prestige.

One way for domestic institutions to grow is to take on international tasks. By expanding their work to collaborations with counterparts from other countries, representatives of domestic institutions can gain valuable experience, increase their budget, create new positions in an

“international office,” and garner prestige that comes from participating in international forums. There are many examples of government officials from domestic government institutions spearheading international initiatives leading to the establishment of IGOs. For instance, some of the main proponents of establishing the aforementioned League Health Organization in 1923 were representatives from the British Ministry of Health (established in 1919) and of the French Health Ministry (established in 1921).³³ Top officials from domestic nongovernmental institutions also push for the creation of INGOs.³⁴

Figure 1 offers a visual illustration of the two hypothesized mechanisms linking domestic activism to intergovernmentalism. The figure shows how activist ideologies can simultaneously empower domestic and international institutions (Arrow 1). Then, even when such ideologies are not promoted any longer, the new domestic institutions increase the likelihood that IGOs will be established or empowered because the bureaucracy has interests in expanding its work to international projects (Arrow 2). One or both mechanisms can operate at a given time.

[Figure 1 about here]

While it is generally difficult to distinguish between the effects of these two mechanisms, the above discussion suggests several potential differences. First, institution-based mechanisms are expected to function narrowly, only within one issue-area. For example, officials from domestic labor institutions are only likely to promote intergovernmentalism in the labor realm. Their vested interests or expertise should not affect developments in other areas.³⁵ In contrast, ideologies, apply both to multiple levels of governance and issues. That is because all decisions for greater government activism (or for rolling back government) across various issue-areas are

influenced by similar belief-systems.

Second, as mentioned, ideological arguments for or against intergovernmentalism are more likely to be made by top elites. In contrast, an institutions-based mechanism will manifest itself through representatives of specialized domestic institutions. Therefore, we consider the direct involvement of officials from such institutions (such as health ministries) in decisions to establish international institutions as necessary but not sufficient evidence of the institution-based mechanism.

Third, as domestic institutions are more likely to value growth early on (before reaching their “survival threshold”), we expect institutional mechanisms to be more prominent in the first few years after domestic institutions are established. Later promotion of intergovernmentalism or nongovernmentalism in an institution’s life is more likely to result from ideological mechanisms.

Lastly, as ideologies are characterized by the need for consistency between beliefs, we expect that the arguments underlying such a mechanism to be normative in nature. Institutions-based mechanisms, in contrast, will be reflected in more technical, pragmatic arguments regarding the greater effectiveness of either an intergovernmental or nongovernmental approach.

The aggregation of preferences: hypotheses

The previous section argued that individual states tend to export their activist domestic preferences to global governance. Yet, how do individual state preferences aggregate to shape more intergovernmental global structures? Preferences, of course, vary across states. For example, in the 1919 Cannes Conference discussed earlier, the U.S. promoted a nongovernmental approach. The U.K. preferred an intergovernmental one, arguing that “the prevention of disease and the protection of the health of the people [is] a primary responsibility

and function of the government.”³⁶ One British official explained the differences arguing that, although both countries balanced “official work” with “voluntary work,” “in England, the official work predominates; in America, I believe I should not be far wrong from saying, it may be the other way around.”³⁷ Indeed, at that time, the U.K. had just established a Ministry of Health while the U.S. did not have a health department for several more decades. Of course, there have been even greater differences between great powers’ preferences for government activism, such as those between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. throughout the Cold War.

To explain how domestic preferences aggregate at the global level, we make two related assumptions. First, we posit that the most powerful states play the greatest role in shaping global governance.³⁸ We begin by considering the impact of the single most powerful state in the system. This expectation is based on extant literature that has long argued that hegemons shape global structures to match their preferences and models.³⁹ However, we also test whether the two or three most powerful states jointly affect the degree of intergovernmentalism in global governance. Indeed, even if negotiations for the establishment of an IGO do not involve all future members (as many states accept what the powerful decide), the original decision of whether an IGO should be established usually includes one or two additional great powers alongside the most powerful state. It is rare to see more than three countries driving this process. For example, although the initiative for establishing the League of Nations originated among American officials, the U.S. later discussed the plans for the new IGO with British and then French (and only later, to a lesser degree, with other states). Similarly, ideas underlying the U.N. originated in the U.S. State Department. In December 1941 they were discussed with British officials and in 1943 with the Soviets.⁴⁰

Second, we posit that, when great powers decide on global governance structures, the end

result is a compromise between their preferences. Such preferences may be similar (as when the WHO was established) or different (as when the LRCS was established). Overall, we argue that great powers' average level of support for government activism will determine the outcome.⁴¹

These arguments lead to the following main hypothesis of this study:

H₁: The greater degree of domestic government activism of the most powerful states in the system, the more likely it is that IGOs will be established.

To assess whether domestic activism influences preferences for intergovernmentalism beyond IGO establishment, we also offer an analogous hypothesis, based on the same logic as H₁, regarding the likelihood of states joining an IGO:

H₂: The greater degree of domestic government activism in a state, the more likely it is that the state will join IGOs.

We also draw on existing literature to identify (and control) for the potential role of nongovernmental actors in shaping the global governance.⁴² Early literature, tended to imply that, in fact, when governmental actors truly want to play a stronger role in global governance, they simply step in and replace them.⁴³ While recent literature continues to acknowledge that when governmental actors have powerful incentives to control global governance (especially where there are strong "sovereignty costs" to them, as in the security realm) they will be virtually alone in shaping issue-areas, it also recognizes that, most often, nongovernmental actors have their own specific preferences and take actions that can run counter to states' interests.⁴⁴

This literature notes that nongovernmental actors, like all organizations,⁴⁵ conduct their work rationally, seeking to maximize material and nonmaterial resources.⁴⁶ When governments do not act, nongovernmental entities emerge and existing ones see opportunities to grow, strategically filling "niches" where they have an advantage.⁴⁷ Even when governments do not

completely step aside from an issue-area, nongovernmental actors have an interest in becoming involved in global governance. Most important, they often seek to work with IGOs that have similar goals as theirs because they can gain material resources, expertise, and prestige through such collaborations.⁴⁸

Nongovernmental actors' decisions to become involved in global governance and governmental actors' decisions to allow or encourage them to do so are not solely based on narrow organizational interests and on ideological or domestic institutional factors, respectively. They may also result from the functional differences between the two types of actors, giving each of them greater advantages or disadvantages in various realms and at various times. In other words, one type of actor may simply be viewed as more effective than the other in a given instance. Indeed, the flexibility, entrepreneurial qualities, and low "entry costs" of nongovernmental actors allow them to become more quickly involved in a global issue-area than IGOs.⁴⁹ Once they establish a prominent role, they may seek to maintain it by framing problems and acting as gatekeepers to issue-areas.⁵⁰

While these characteristics of nongovernmental actors initially lead to an increase in their number, in time, because of competition among them, and the filling up of possible "niches," their growth tapers off. The increases in organizational density of nongovernmental actors may thus lead to more demand for other types of actors (such as intergovernmental ones) to step in.⁵¹

Nongovernmental actors also have disadvantages that may affect their ability to participate in some issue-areas. Most important, their weakness in enforcing international agreements has been seen as a major hindrance in their capacity to deal with problems where there are especially high stakes for governments, such as in territorial disputes.⁵² More broadly, the literature notes that when sovereignty costs are high, as in the case of the security realm,

nongovernmental actors are less likely to participate in global governance.⁵³ Nongovernmental actors' relative lack of involvement in such realms is not solely the result of governments selfishly seeking to keep the issue-area to themselves. It is also due to a common understanding that nongovernmental actors are not as well suited to deal with such problems. When testing our main arguments regarding governments establishing and joining IGOs, we therefore take into account both potential differences brought about by organizational density and those due to sovereignty costs.

The following section tests our arguments through an in-depth study of the global governance of education. This issue can be considered a relatively hard case for intergovernmentalism.⁵⁴ For a long time, states felt that due to the important role of education in shaping ideas and national identities, this realm was too important to allow for outside influence. Indeed, the strong linkage between education and sovereignty led states to argue up until World War II that this issue will “always” fall outside the competence of IGOs.⁵⁵

We chose to focus on global education because over the past century and a half its intergovernmental nature experienced significant variation. Its evolution includes cases of nongovernmental actors being preferred over IGOs, IGOs replacing nongovernmental actors, powerful states joining and leaving IGOs. Such variation gives us multiple opportunities (that can be seen as numerous successive cases, rather than one single case) to assess the strength of our arguments. For each instance of change in global governance, we ascertain the degree to which education was being dealt with through governmental or nongovernmental domestic institutions in the most powerful states. Also, we determine whether officials from such states took positions supporting an intergovernmental or nongovernmental approach to the global governance of education. We expect to find that states where governments took an active role in

education domestically were more likely to support establishing education-related IGOs (H₁) and become members of such IGOs (H₂).

Additionally, the case study allows us to distinguish between changes due to the ideology-based mechanism and the institutions-based one. We expect officials from domestic education institutions to have focused solely on establishing and joining IGOs in the education realm (the institutions-based mechanism) while top officials connected their arguments regarding education realm to broader developments (the ideology-based mechanism). We also expect that officials from domestic specialized institutions were most active in promoting the establishment of international organizations in the first years after their own institution was created. Lastly, we expect that normative arguments in support for one form of global governance or another were more likely presented by top-level elites rather than by officials from specialized domestic institutions.

Intergovernmentalism in the global governance of education

The first successful international collaborative efforts in the education realm, starting with the International Bureau of New Schools (founded in 1899), were nongovernmental in nature. While dozens of education INGOs emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, all early attempts to create an education-focused IGO such as the Permanent and International Council of Education (in 1885) were unsuccessful.⁵⁶ Until World War I, efforts to establish IGOs lacked governmental support primarily because most states did not have national public education institutions that could become involved in these initiatives. There were exceptions. In the late eighteenth century Prussia became the first major state where the government partially centralized the administration of education. France followed, establishing a Ministry of Public

Instruction in 1828. The British education system, in contrast, was primarily private and the government's role in education was weak before World War II. Only in 1944 did the Education Act establish a full-fledged Ministry of Education.⁵⁷ In the U.S., although various small federal offices for education were established (in 1867) and then upgraded slightly in 1939 and 1953, the education system remained highly decentralized. The U.S. Department of Education only became a cabinet-level department in 1979.⁵⁸

Early on, the weakness of American federal education institutions limited U.S. ability to become involved in international negotiations for establishing education IGOs. In 1912 the U.S. Office for Education did not participate in the international negotiations involving the establishment of an education IGO. Instead, it appointed Fannie Fern Andrews, the president of the nongovernmental American School Citizenship League, as “Special Collaborator of the U.S. Office for Education” and had her represent the U.S. in the talks.⁵⁹

Nongovernmental pressures to have the League of Nations take on questions of education and establish an intergovernmental International Bureau of Education came up in the 1919 Paris peace talks. Yet the four major powers negotiating the founding of the League ignored the issue.

The lack of League structures dealing with education led member-states to deflect collaborative initiatives to nongovernmental actors. For example, in 1920 the League's Council offered the nongovernmental Union of International Associations financial support to establish an “International University” rather than have the League create this institution.⁶⁰

In 1921, the question of establishing an IGO to deal with “intellectual cooperation” (including cooperation in education) was brought up in the League by several small states. The main opposition to the proposal came from the British representative who cited his country's “strong liberal and individualistic tradition” to explain why intellectual cooperation “should be

left to private organizations and individuals.”⁶¹ As few states backed this initiative (Italy being the only powerful state supporting it), the proposal failed. The British view was reflected in a League Council report concluding that “under present world conditions intellectual cooperation can best be advanced by means of voluntary efforts.”⁶²

Just a few months later, the balance in great power support for an education IGO appeared to shift when Leon Berard, the French Minister of Public Instruction, convinced his cabinet colleague, Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, to promote the creation of a League office for international intellectual relations among universities and schools.⁶³ Despite the renewed effort, British opposition⁶⁴ led the League to conclude that “national education lies outside and will always lie outside the competence of any official committee of the League.”⁶⁵

By the mid-1920s, as it was clear that the League would not take up education issues, those supporting international initiatives in this realm promoted the establishment of two organizations. The International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIC) was a French initiative that developed soon after the 1924 elections in France brought in a government with strong activist views.⁶⁶ Although officials from the French Ministry of Public Instruction preferred an IGO specifically for education, they realized that the majority of League members would not support it. Therefore, they presented a proposal to incoming minister, Francois Albert (an outspoken supporter of the state’s role in education⁶⁷), to establish the IIC under the League umbrella. The institution would include education as one aspect of intellectual cooperation and was to be funded entirely by the French government. League members accepted the new institute (dismissing the token British opposition) as it did not involve any costs for them.⁶⁸ However, despite French efforts to have the IIC deal with some education issues, the League refused to expand the institute’s role to this realm.

The second collaborative international initiative in this realm was the nongovernmental International Bureau for Education (IBE). It was founded in 1926 by the Canton of Geneva, several small states and the Rockefeller Foundation (that financed much of the organization's work). It was intended to engage in the education tasks that the League had refused to take on. No major power backed the establishment of the IBE. The French government initially preferred concentrating its international work and financial commitments in this realm solely on the IIC.⁶⁹ By 1929, without meaningful government financing and in a period where the increasing number of INGOs were vying for the reduced resources available, it became clear the IBE could not fulfill the tasks envisioned by its founders.⁷⁰ Yet, by that time, there were already sufficient states, including France, willing to transform the IBE into an IGO. France, Germany, and Italy (all with strong domestic government education institutions)⁷¹ became members of the intergovernmental IBE. The U.K. and U.S. did not join. The IBE's limited membership obligated it to engage only in a few small tasks. After World War II it was absorbed by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Planning for a post-World War II education IGO started in the U.K. During the war, the country began undergoing a process leading to the establishment of the modern welfare state. The 1942 Beveridge Report that called for tackling society's "five giant evils" (including "ignorance"), inspired the expansion of the state's role. In this context, the 1944 British Education Act increased the government's role in this realm, creating an Education Ministry.

Richard Butler, who oversaw the establishment of the new ministry, sought ways to expand the role of this institution. He quickly understood the need and opportunity for international initiatives as he opened discussions with education ministers from eight governments in exile in London. He institutionalized periodic meetings with them to discuss

post-war educational reconstruction.⁷² In January 1943 this newly formed Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) called for the establishment of the intergovernmental “United Nations Bureau for Educational Reconstruction.”⁷³

In July 1943, under American pressure, CAME expanded its membership to non-European states.⁷⁴ U.S. interest in the new IGO came on the heels of increased American domestic activism in education. Indeed, by 1939, as part of the Roosevelt Administration’s expansion of government functions, a new Federal Security Agency took over the small Bureau of Education, transforming it into a comprehensive office. Just like the British Ministry of Education, the new U.S. Office of Education sought to expand its work with international initiatives. For example, in 1941 it proposed establishing an intellectual and educational IGO for the Western Hemisphere.⁷⁵

When the U.S. first attended CAME in April 1944, the American delegation was made up of individuals with experience in education policy, including top officials from the new Office of Education. The U.S. quickly took control of CAME proceedings, submitting a proposal to establish an “entirely new organization.”⁷⁶ It was envisioned as strictly intergovernmental, with virtually no role for INGOs. Although American representatives framed the *need* for an international organization in normative terms (as reflected in the U.S.-authored preamble of UNESCO’s constitution⁷⁷) their support for an intergovernmental solution was presented pragmatically, suggesting simply that the IGO would complement the nongovernmental work already taking place in the educational, cultural, and scientific realms.⁷⁸

The French, using the example of the ILO that had been in existence for more than twenty years, offered a hybrid model for UNESCO.⁷⁹ They proposed an organization where each state be represented by two delegates from governments and three from national education and

culture NGOs. Delegates would vote, as in the ILO, independently, rather than as national groups. Small states preferred this structure because they felt it would erode great power influence.⁸⁰ France supported it because it thought that appealing to the IIC's still vibrant network of Paris-based INGOs would help it gain support for its main goal: landing the headquarters of the IGO in Paris. The U.S. and U.K. argued that less developed states would not be able to send five delegates and called for each state to have only one vote.⁸¹

At the November 1945 London preparatory conference delegates were faced with a choice between two proposals, a purely intergovernmental one, authored by the U.K. and U.S., and a hybrid one giving membership and votes both to governments and nongovernmental entities, sponsored by France.⁸² During negotiations the U.S. and U.K. kept most of the intergovernmental character of their proposal but acquiesced to some nongovernmental elements. They agreed that individuals on UNESCO's Board could come from nongovernmental institutions, not just governmental ones, and would sit in their personal capacity rather than representing governments.⁸³ Also, although INGOs were not given voting power, UNESCO's constitution called for "suitable arrangements for consultation and co-operation" with INGOs, thus setting an example for the entire UN system.⁸⁴ Moreover, it specified, as no IGO founding document had before, that the organization could support INGOs financially. During the first post-war years, most UNESCO projects were tasked to existing INGOs or to new ones that were often established with UNESCO funding.⁸⁵

By the 1950s UNESCO's nongovernmental elements began to erode, in part, because of American McCarthyist pressures to eliminate staff independence across the entire UN system. Additionally, when the Soviet Union joined the organization in 1954 it promoted its statist ideology to UNESCO's working methods and policies. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the

strong Soviet intergovernmental approach to global governance was embraced by many other states from the Second and Third World. One UNESCO official noted that during that period, the “wind [blew] increasingly cold for NGOs.”⁸⁶

Starting in the late 1970s, the U.S. began complaining about the IGO’s policies. Tensions increased during the Reagan Administration due to what observers considered to be powerful conservative ideological factors.⁸⁷ In December 1983, the U.S. threatened to leave UNESCO, accusing it of “statism” because it had a “tendency to prefer government institutions of development to those of the private sector.”⁸⁸ A senior political appointee from the State Department characterized the organization as a “compulsively statist [...] Orwellian nightmare – complete with ‘Big Brother’.”⁸⁹ In 1984 the U.S. left the IGO. The U.K. followed a year later using similar arguments.⁹⁰

During its two decades of withdrawal from UNESCO the U.S. sought other channels to deliver education aid, especially through INGOs. Moreover, it pushed IGOs where it had greater influence, such as the World Bank and UNICEF, to become more involved in this issue-area. Both of these IGOs began giving more prominent roles to INGOs.⁹¹ Starting 2000, the neoliberal approach to education primarily promoted by the World Bank (that saw education as an investment in human capital and promoted a shift from public to private education systems) and the redistribution-based approach emphasized by UNESCO, came closer together through the efforts of the European Union.⁹²

When the U.S. returned to UNESCO in 2003, it continued promoting a more nongovernmental character for the IGO. In 2012 it played the leading role in getting UNESCO to adopt a “Policy Framework for Strategic Partnership,” formalizing relations with the private sector.⁹³ Powerful private organizations such as the Gates and Hewlett foundations have since

become active in international education programs through IGOs and, directly, on their own.⁹⁴ In UNESCO private foundations now contribute more to educational programs through voluntary donations than governments.⁹⁵ The change can be interpreted as yet another facet of the recent shift towards nongovernmentalism in this realm.

Discussion of case study

The above narrative offers support for our main arguments. As a reminder, we expected that states where governments took a more active role in education domestically were more likely to support establishing IGOs (H₁) and joining them (H₂). Indeed, in the early twentieth century, France, with an activist domestic government approach to education, was the main proponent of establishing an education IGO. It was successful in creating the IIBC, albeit, with the understanding that the institute would not take up education questions. After the IBE was established in 1929 as an IGO, France, Germany and Italy, all with strong government roles in education, became members, while the U.K. and U.S. (with nongovernmental inclinations at that time) did not join.

After World War II, when the U.K. and U.S. shifted domestically towards greater government involvement in education, they too supported an IGO in this realm. As the Soviet Union became more influential internationally, it sought to project its domestic statist views to IGOs like UNESCO. By the 1980s, the U.S. and U.K. moved away from activism in domestic governance. They also criticized UNESCO's statist approach and eventually withdrew from the IGO. Powerful states with strong roles for governments in education remained members. Over the past two decades, U.S. promotion of its domestic public-private partnership models to global governance led to a shift towards nongovernmentalism in the education realm.

In sum, the case study shows that shifts towards intergovernmentalism were promoted primarily by powerful states with strong domestic activist preferences.⁹⁶ Shifts towards nongovernmentalism were generally promoted by states opposing activism domestically.⁹⁶

We also expected that officials from domestic education institutions contributed to decisions of establishing and joining international education organizations. Indeed, the attempts to establish an education IGO before World War I failed in great part because powerful states did not yet have domestic institutions that could send representatives to negotiate intergovernmental agreements. For example, in 1912 the U.S. was represented by the director of an NGO at an international conference intended to establish an IGO. The result was that global governance remained nongovernmental.

After World War I, British and American representatives involved in debates on possible collaborations in education did not come from the weak domestic governmental education offices but, rather, from top government institutions. The main support for a new IGO at that time came from the French Ministry of Public Instruction, a powerful specialized institution. The fact that the education minister was a cabinet member with direct access to his colleague, the foreign minister, explains French support for the IGO.

British plans for UNESCO after World War II, came from the new Education Ministry. The U.S. was also prepared for intergovernmental negotiations in this realm after the Office of Education had been expanded in 1939. After World War II, all major states had the necessary domestic institutions to negotiate detailed questions of education in IGOs.

The evolution of the education realm also reveals instances when government officials invoked ideological arguments. This appeared to have been the case in the 1920s and 1980s when the U.S. and U.K. argued against intergovernmentalism and throughout the entire Cold

War when the Soviet Union promoted intergovernmentalism. In these instances, the arguments were made, as expected, by top officials dealing with multiple issues, rather than by officials from education institutions and were framed in normative terms.

The change in the intergovernmental nature of global education governance thus reveals evidence of both norms-based and institutions-based mechanisms. As expected, the strongest evidence of the institution-based mechanism can be found after World War II, in the years immediately following the establishment education institutions in the U.S. and U.K. However, even in this case, the new domestic institutions emerged due to domestic ideological activist shifts. Moreover, the presence of officials from education institutions in the international delegations determining the fate of IGOs was decided by high-level government elites with clear ideological preferences. This suggests that, even when institutional mechanisms were present, they may have been the immediate cause of changes in global governance, while the ideological ones were the permissive causes of change.⁹⁷ Further in-depth research of developments in other issue-areas is needed to help us understand better the relationship between the two mechanisms as well as the potential differences across such issues. Lastly, the history of the education realm reminds us that there are other factors besides domestic ideologies and institutions that affect intergovernmental approaches to global governance. Indeed, the cyclical nature of global governance in the education realm was in great part the result of the rise and decline of great powers, as well as by the changes in domestic government ideologies and institutions in such states. However, the shift towards intergovernmentalism or nongovernmentalism can be explained by other factors influencing great power interests. For instance, French support for a hybrid UNESCO was primarily a bargaining chip in securing the IGO's headquarters in Paris. Similarly, U.S. McCarthyist pressures that eroded the nongovernmental character of UNESCO

were due to emerging Cold War tensions between superpowers, rather than a projection of domestic government activism.

Large-N tests

Are our findings in global education governance generalizable to other realms? To answer this question, we conducted several large-N tests of governments' decisions to 1) establish and 2) join IGOs.⁹⁸

For our statistical analysis of IGO establishment, we used data from the Yearbook of International Organizations.⁹⁹ The Yearbook has collected information on IGOs and INGOs for more than a century. It has been used often for developing datasets involving such organizations.¹⁰⁰ Our measure of IGO establishment is the number of new organizations that emerged each year ("NewIGOs"). It accounts for all organizations, regional and global. The number of new IGOs varies between 0 and 55.

For our main model (1.1) the explanatory variable reflects domestic government activism of the most powerful state ("GovActivism"). We also developed measures for the average government activism of the two and three most powerful states, weighted by their power (measured as CINC scores) to reflect power differences among these states.¹⁰¹ We identified the most powerful states using data from the National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset (v 4.0).¹⁰² GovActivism was operationalized as the ratio between states' government expenditures and their GDP. Although this is not a perfect measure of activism, as government spending is also influenced by other international and domestic factors that governments do not directly control (such as wars and broad economic and demographic trends), it is nevertheless a representative gauge of government involvement in resolving domestic collective problems.

Both practitioners and academics have used such an operationalization to illustrate the degree of government activism across states.¹⁰³ Our measure was based on data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.¹⁰⁴ We standardized this variable to make interpretation of results easier.¹⁰⁵

Our models control for factors identified in the literature as affecting the establishment of IGOs. First, research suggests that IGOs are less likely to form during times of conflict, but immediately after major wars, their number surges because states seek to promote cooperation.¹⁰⁶ The variable “Conflict” is the number of disputes in which the (one, two, or three) most powerful states were involved in a given year.¹⁰⁷ It is based on data from the Correlates of War 1816-2007 dataset (v4.0).¹⁰⁸

Conversely, the literature notes that peaceful inter-state interactions lead to IGO establishment. Such cooperation is seen as a result of both greater economic interdependence and information flows. Trade and information flows lead to more similar interests among states and, implicitly, to more IGOs for resolving collective problems.¹⁰⁹

As economic and informational interactions are strongly correlated, a model testing simultaneously the independent impact of these two factors would face problems of multicollinearity. We therefore developed a composite measure (“Interactions”) bringing together two measures used by previous literature: the relative degree of information flows¹¹⁰ and the relative degree of economic flows (as measured by the country’s imports and exports), giving them equal weight. It is based on data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.¹¹¹ “Interactions” represents the sum of such measures for the one, two, or three most powerful states, respectively.

The literature also suggests that, as more states emerge, the number of problems they

need to resolve through IGOs increases.¹¹² Indeed, during the era of decolonization as the number of independent states doubled, regional and global IGOs mushroomed, trying to keep up with issues relevant for such states. The relative number of new states (“NewStates”) is operationalized as the ratio between new states established in a given year and the existing number of states. It is based on data from the State System Membership dataset, v2011.

We also control for the distribution of power in the international system because it has long been argued that cooperation is more likely when the most powerful states (or, at least the hegemon) are able to impose the rules underlying new IGOs.¹¹³ The distribution of power (“Power”) is a measure based on data from the NMC dataset (v 4.0). It is operationalized as the sum of “CINC” scores (proportion of the world’s power) of the one, two, or three most powerful countries.¹¹⁴

Our models also control for the number of existing intergovernmental and nongovernmental actors in a given year (“IGOs” and “INGOs”). We do so because, as mentioned, recent research shows that organizational density in global governance may lead organizations to compete for the limited resources available.¹¹⁵ This suggests that, the number IGOs or INGOs¹¹⁶ in existence, will impact governments’ decisions to establish new IGOs. The “INGOs” variable is also operationalized using data from the Yearbook of International Organizations.

The descriptive statistics for all measures are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. The main model being tested is Model 1.1: $\text{NewIGOs} = B_0 + B_1(\text{GovActivism}) + B_2(\text{Conflict}) + B_3(\text{Interactions}) + B_4(\text{NewStates}) + B_5(\text{Power}) + B_6(\text{IGOs}) + B_7(\text{INGOs}) + e$.

Existing literature suggests that negotiations leading to the establishment of IGOs generally take multiple years. As previous studies chose five-year time frames for assessing IGO

establishment,¹¹⁷ we use five-year lags based on weighted moving averages for explanatory and control variables. We test Model 1.1 using Prais–Winsten regression with robust standard errors¹¹⁸ because we find that by using time series data the assumption of non-autocorrelation is violated (Durbin-Watson statistic of .778). The analysis considers yearly observations from 1866 to 2007. The period is the longest possible one for which all necessary data were available.

The results of these tests are presented in Table 1. We include results for the main model that considers the impact of government activism of the most powerful state (Model 1.1), and of the ones that consider the two and three most powerful states (Model 1.2 and 1.3, respectively).

[Table 1 about here]

The results show that domestic government activism of the most powerful states is indeed a strong predictor of intergovernmentalism, as reflected in the emergence of new IGOs. This is true, whether one considers only the role of the most powerful state, or of the two or three most powerful states. In fact, as we move from considering only the role of the most powerful state (Model 1.1) to the ones of the two and then three most powerful states (Models 1.2 and 1.3, respectively), our predictive power appears to improve, with slightly higher R-squared for the models. Moreover, it is important to point out that this variable is significant even when controlling for the explanatory factors mentioned in other works as influencing the emergence of IGOs.

We ran additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings. We controlled for military expenditures (Model 1.4), and tested models with only one of three strongly correlated variables (“IGOs,” “INGOs,” and “Interactions”), excluding the other two variables (Models 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7). We considered a model (1.8) in which we controlled for the level of democracy of

the most powerful states, to ensure that we are truly capturing the broader impact of government activism and not just authoritarianism. Model 1.9 assesses power based solely on economic factors. Model 1.10 controls for the emergence of security IGOs in order to assess the impact of sovereignty costs for governments. Model 1.11 considers the reverse of our main hypothesis: whether lack of government activism of the most powerful state leads to an increase in the number of *nongovernmental* actors taking on global issues (as a reflection of nongovernmentalism). Model 1.12 uses the total number of states in the system (rather than the proportion of new states to the total number of states). Model 1.13 controls for the variable “year” to assess if the estimation is robust to the inclusion of time trends. In models 1.14 and 1.15 we control for the power of the single most powerful state (the hegemon) instead of the aggregate proportion of global power of the two and three most powerful states. We also ran robustness checks for Models 1.1-1.3 using negative binomial regression (Models 1.16, 1.17, and 1.18). A more in-depth discussion of the reasons for introducing such tests, the measures we used, and the results are included in the Appendix. All additional tests support our main hypothesis.

We also tested H₂ regarding the likelihood that states will join (or leave) IGOs. Model 2.1, the main one for this hypothesis, utilized as dependent variable (“IGOMember”) the percentage change in IGO membership for a country over the past five years. It is based on data from the Correlates of War International Governmental Organizations dataset (Version 2.0).¹¹⁹ We considered change over five years because the dataset only includes observations every five years prior to 1965. To gain greater confidence in results we also ran a test (Model 2.2) utilizing as dependent variable the percentage change in IGO membership over only one year. This test was run only for the period when yearly data were available: 1965-2005.

Models 2.1 and 2.2 use the same explanatory variables reflecting government activism as in Models 1.1-1.3. We also control, for the same reasons mentioned in our discussion of Model 1.1, for the number of disputes in which the country is involved and the level of economic and informational interactions. While we do not consider the system-level variables reflecting power distribution, number of INGOs, and number of new states (as these do not impact individual states joining an IGO), we nevertheless control for the number of IGOs in existence as such numbers affect the options states have for joining new IGOs. Additionally, we control for states' levels of democracy ("Democracy"), as literature shows that such levels impact decisions to join IGOs.¹²⁰ The measure was based on democracy scores from the Polity IV dataset.¹²¹ Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix offer descriptive statistics for Models 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.

$$\text{Model 2: IGOMember} = B_0 + B_1(\text{GovActivism}) + B_2(\text{Conflict}) + B_3(\text{Interactions}) + B_4(\text{IGOs}) + B_5(\text{Democracy}) + e$$

To test this model we used pooled time series cross sectional analysis with country fixed effects.¹²² The unit of analysis is country-year. We only consider the three most powerful countries due to lack of data for smaller states. The results are presented in Table 2.

[Table 2 about here]

These tests support the argument that states are more likely to join IGOs at times of greater domestic government activism. Indeed, government activism is highly significant regardless of using 5-year or 1-year intervals. Additionally, the timeframes of the two tests (over 140 or 40 years) do not have a significant effect on results for the main variable.¹²³

Model 2.1 shows that one standard deviation increase in government activism of a state leads that state to join 50.51 more IGOs over a period of five years. Model 2.2 shows that one

standard deviation increase in government activism of a state during one year leads that state to join 7.67 more IGOs. Once more, it is important to note the significance of our explanatory variable even when controlling for all other factors already discussed in the literature.

Conclusions: implications of the findings

Taken together, the case study and statistical analyses offer considerable support for our main argument. Powerful states are more likely to promote intergovernmentalism when they embrace government activism domestically. This finding complements the broad body of literature that has discussed states' choices between multilateralism and unilateralism. Overall, states are more likely to seek intergovernmental solutions to global problems 1) when they believe that they should step in to deal with such problems and 2) when they can cooperate with each other.

However, our findings should be understood more broadly than simply reflecting choices for establishing and joining IGOs. They have important implications for several broader debates in the study of global governance. The world's movement across time and issue-area back and forth on the intergovernmental-nongovernmental continuum may be a reflection of the degree to which global governance, in general, has shifted towards (or away from) having states as the only relevant actors. By placing recent developments in the broader temporal context of this study, we can better understand that changes are likely temporary in nature and that, in the future, it is not clear as some may imply¹²⁴ that states are "losing control" over global governance. Shifts across the broader intergovernmental-nongovernmental continuum are not unidirectional. Such cyclical patterns may be partially due to shifts in systemic factors such as global conflict, economic interactions, or support for democracy. However, they are often also

due to the rise and decline of great powers and the ideological shifts such countries experience. Just as we have seen the U.S. support a more governmental approach during the first half of the Cold War and a more nongovernmental approach during the 1920s and since the 1980s, we can expect other changes in the future. For example, with China's rise, its activist domestic approach may lead to global shifts towards greater intergovernmentalism. Moreover, the very different positions of candidates in the 2016 U.S. primary and general elections, suggests how quickly the most powerful state may shift preferences on the governmental-nongovernmental continuum when one candidate or another is elected.

At a deeper theoretical level, our findings support the argument that domestic ideologies and institutions affect global structures. Specifically, they show that to understand global developments we need to combine structural factors, related to conflict, interdependence and power distribution, with state preferences. It is such "social purpose" that affects the nature of global governance institutions.¹²⁵ By bringing state preferences into the explanation of IGO emergence and membership, this research offers yet another linkage between the domestic and international realms that for a long time were considered so different that they could only be explained using separate theoretical approaches.

Finally, our approach takes an important step toward answering the call of World Polity Theory to develop a general theory of conditions under which nongovernmental or intergovernmental actors are more likely to take the lead.¹²⁶ Our study approaches this question from a political science perspective rather than the sociological perspective that generated World Polity Theory. It should not be surprising therefore that, although we take into account the role of nongovernmental actors, we place a greater emphasis on powerful states and their ability to alter global governance. In fact, we believe that our approach, focusing on governments' choices and

the emergence and use of IGOs (Political Science's usual "turf"), needs to be combined with an approach explaining how transnational nongovernmental actors and societal forces react to government efforts to change the global system (Sociology's traditional "turf").

Such a two-pronged approach may offer the most promising future research direction in explaining both the nongovernmental and intergovernmental trends in global governance. It would allow us address some of the questions that the present study has touched upon only indirectly: Can nongovernmental actors alter the nature of global governance even when powerful states do not leave them much space for action? Under what conditions will nongovernmental actors take on a greater role in global governance if and when governments allow or encourage them to take on such a role? The pursuit of these questions may lead to the development of a rich research agenda that would add to our understanding of past and future shifts across the intergovernmental-nongovernmental continuum.

REFERENCES

- Abbott, Kenneth W., Jessica F. Green, and Robert O. Keohane. 2016. "Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance." *International Organization* 70, no. 2: 247–277. doi:10.1017/S0020818315000338
- Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. 2015. *International Organizations as Orchestrators*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139979696
- Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3: 689-718. doi: 10.2307/1954423
- Andonova, Liliana B., Thomas N. Hale, and Charles B. Roger. 2017. "National Policy and Transnational Governance of Climate Change: Substitutes or Complements?" *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 2: 253-268. doi:10.1093/isq/sqx014
- Avant, Deborah D., Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell (eds.) 2010. *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511845369
- Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38, no.1: 226-254. doi: 10.2307/2010357
- Banks, Arthur S, and Kenneth A. Wilson. 2015. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Databanks International. Jerusalem, Israel, <http://www.databanksinternational.com>
- Bennett, A. LeRoy, and James K. Oliver. 2002. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Boli, John, and George M. Thomas. 1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Borgwardt, Elizabeth. 2005. *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Borowy, Iris. 2009. *Coming to Terms with World Health the League of Nations Health Organisation 1921-1946*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Burley, Anne-Marie. 1993. "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Protection of the New Deal Regulatory State." In John Gerard Ruggie. ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York. N.Y.: Columbia University Press.
- Carpenter, Charli. 2010. "Governing the Global Agenda: 'Gatekeepers' and 'Issue Adoption' in Transnational Advocacy Networks." In Martha Finnemore, Deborah Avant and Susan Sell, eds., *Who Governs the Globe?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511845369
- Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. 1945. Minutes of the 7th Meeting of the Drafting Committee held on 18th of April 1945.
- Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International Security* 27, no.1: 5-39. doi: 10.1162/016228802320231217
- Correlates of War Project. 2011. State System Membership List, v2011.<http://correlatesofwar.org>

- Cummings, William K. 2008. "How Educational Systems Form and Reform." *World Studies in Education* 9, no. 1: 5-30. doi: 10.7459/wse/09.1.02
- Davies, Gwilym. 1943. *Intellectual Co-Operation Between the Two Wars*. London, UK: Council for Education in World Citizenship.
- DeMars, William. 2005. *NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics*, London: Pluto Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1966. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown.
- Farley, John. 2008. *Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold War*. Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2007. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Glenn, John. 2009. "Welfare Spending in an Era of Globalization: The North-South Divide." *International Relations* 23, no. 1: 27-50. doi: 10.1177/0047117808100608
- Grigorescu, Alexandru and Caglayan Baser. 2018a. "Replication Data for: The Choice Between Intergovernmentalism and Nongovernmentalism: Projecting Domestic Preferences to Global Governance" <https://doi.org/10/7910/DVN/ES6FJO>, Harvard Dataverse, v1.
- Grigorescu, Alexandru and Caglayan Baser. 2018b. Supplementary material for "The Choice Between Intergovernmentalism and Nongovernmentalism: Projecting Domestic Preferences to Global Governance" at <https://doi.org/10.1017/tkkt>.
- Hale, Thomas N., and Charles B. Roger. 2014. "Orchestration and Transnational Climate Governance." *The Review of International Organizations* 9, no. 1: 59-82. doi:10.1007/s11558-013-9174-0
- Hanrieder, Tine. 2015. "Who Orchestrates? Coping with Competitors in Global Health." In Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. eds., *International Organizations as Orchestrators*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139979696
- Harries, Owen. 1984. "UNESCO – Time to Leave." The Heritage Foundation Memorandum #68 on International Organizations. December 10, 1984 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1984/12/unesco-time-to-leave>
- Hofstetter, Rita. 2015. "Building An 'International Code for Public Education': Behind the Scenes at the International Bureau of Education (1925-1946)" *Prospects* 45, no. 1: 31-48. doi:10.1007/s11125-015-9336-3
- Hoggart, Richard. 1978. *An Idea and Its Servants: UNESCO from Within*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
- Howard-Jones, Norman. 1978. *International Public Health between the Two World Wars: The Organizational Problems*. Geneva: World Health Organization.
- International Bureau of Education 1926. Bureau International D'Education: Historique. Bureau of International Education Archives 171/14/14
- International Bureau of Education 1929. Minutes of second General Assembly of Bureau of International Education, July 25, 1929.

- Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Tana. 2016. Cooperation, Co-optation, Competition, Conflict: International Bureaucracies and Non-Governmental Organizations in an Interdependent World, *Review of International Political Economy* 23, no. 5: 737-767. doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1217902.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. *Power and Interdependence*. New York, N.Y.: Longman
- Kloppenbergh, James T. 1988. *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870 - 1920*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables." *International Organization* 36, no. 2: 497-510. doi:10.1017/S0020818300019032
- Lavelle, Kathryn 2005. "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in International Organizations: US Involvement in the League of Nations." *The Review of International Organizations* 2, no.4: 371-393. doi: 10.1007/s11558-007-9015-0
- League of Nations Council. 1921. Draft Report for the Establishment of an International Office of Education. 12th session. March 1, 1921.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944." *International Interactions* 28, no. 3: 237-260 doi: 10.1080/03050620213653
- Mansfield, Edward D. 1995. *Power, Trade and War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization* 60, no. 1: 137-167. doi:10.1017/S002081830606005X
- Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jagers. 2002. Polity IV Project: *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002*. Version p4v2002e [Computer File]. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, College Park, MD: University of Maryland.
- McCoy, David, Gayatri Kumbhavi, Jinesh Patel, and Akish Luintel. 2009. "The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's Grant-Making Programme For Global Health." *The Lancet* 373, no. 9675: 1645-1653. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60571-7
- Medical Conference. 1919. Proceedings of The Medical Conference held at the Invitation of The Committee of Red Cross Societies, April 1-11. Cannes, France: League of Red Cross Societies.
- Mullins, Willard. 1972. "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 2:498-510. doi:10.2307/1957794
- Mundy, Karen. 2010. "Education for All" and the Global Governors." In Avant, Deborah D.,

- Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, eds., *Who governs the globe?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511845369
- Mylonas, Denis. 1976. *La Genèse de l'Unesco: La Conférence des Ministres Alliés de L'éducation: 1942-1945*. Bruxelles: E. Bruylant.
- New York Times*. 1981. "U.N. Energy Talks end with Plea for Money." August 23. www.nytimes.com/1981/08/23/world/un-energy-talks-end-with-plea-for-money.html, accessed at December 11, 2017.
- Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom and Kevin Warnke. 2004. "The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0 Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, no. 2: 101-119. doi: 10.1080/07388940490463933
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey. *New Directions for Organization Theory Problems and Prospects*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Preston, William, Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller. 1989. *Hope & Folly: The United States and UNESCO, 1945-1985*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Renoliet, Jean-Jacques. 1999. *L'Unesco Oubliée: La Société des Nations Et La Coopération Intellectuelle, 1919-1946*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36, no. 2: 379-415 doi: 10.1017/S0020818300018993
- Salamon, Lester M., and Helmut K. Anheier. 1999. *Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-National Analysis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1969. "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems." *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 2: 398-411. doi:10.2307/1954696.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. 2010. *Resort to War: 1816-2007*. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Sewell, James Patrick. 1975. *UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Shanks, Cheryl, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Jeffrey H. Kaplan. 1996. "Inertia and Change in The Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992." *International Organization* 50, no. 4: 593-627 doi:10.1017/S002081830003352X
- Shea, Nathan. 2016. "Nongovernment Organizations as Mediators: Making Peace in Aceh, Indonesia." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 28, no. 2: 177-196. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2016.1162778>
- Singer, J. David, and Michael Wallace. 1970. "Intergovernmental Organization and The Preservation of Peace, 1816-1964: Some Bivariate Relationships." *International Organization* 24, no. 3: 520-547. doi:10.1017/S0020818300026023
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In Bruce Russett, ed. *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Skjelsbaek, Kjell. 1971. "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the

- Twentieth Century.” In Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. *A New World Order*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Steffek, Jens. 2013. “Explaining Cooperation between IGOs and NGOs – Push Factors, Pull Factors, and the Policy Cycle.” *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 4: 993–1013. doi:10.1017/S0260210512000393
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton. doi: 10.1046/j.0391-5026.2003.00107.x
- Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jönsson. 2013. *The Opening Up of International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Talbott, John E. 2015. *Politics of Educational Reform in France, 1918-1940*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Union of International Associations. 2015. *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Union of International Associations, Brussels, Belgium.
- United Nations Conference for the Establishment of an Educational and Cultural Organization. 1945. French Proposals for the Constitution of the United Nations Organization of Intellectual Co-operation. September 12. ECO/CWC/5.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board. 2012. UNESCO Policy Framework for Strategic Partnerships: A Comprehensive Partnership Strategy 190. September 10. EX/INF.7. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002175/217583e.pdf>, accessed December 8, 2017.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 2016. Voluntary Contributions Received for Special Accounts & Other for the period 1 January-31 December 2015. BFM/2016/PI/H/1 <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002444/244459e.pdf>, accessed December 8, 2017.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Preparatory Commission. 1946. UNESCO, Rev. 1, Chapter 3, August 16. Prep.Com/51
- U.S. Department of Education. 2010. Overview of the U.S. Department of Education. <http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what.pdf>, accessed December 8, 2017.
- Wallace, Michael, and David J. Singer. 1970. “Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964: A Quantitative Description.” *International Organization* 24, no. 2: 239-287. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830002590X>
- Wohlforth, William 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” *International Security*. 24, no.1: 5-41. doi: 10.1162/016228899560031

NOTES

¹ Howard-Jones 1978.

² For a discussion of this term, see Avant et al. 2010.

³ Hanrieder 2015, 191.

⁴ Chan 2010.

⁵ McCoy et al. 2009; also www.who.int/about/funding/top20.pdf.

⁶ E.g., Krasner 1982; Keohane 1984; Shanks et al. 1996; Rathbun 2012.

⁷ E.g., DeMars 2005; Steffek 2013; Abbott et al. 2015; Johnson 2016.

⁸ E.g., Abbott et al. 2015; Hale and Roger 2014; Tallberg et al. 2013

⁹ Abbott et al. 2016.

¹⁰ Andonova et al. 2017.

¹¹ Burley 1993; Borgwardt 2005.

¹² Salamon and Anheiner 1999.

¹³ See, e.g., Kloppenberg 1988.

¹⁴ Strange 1996.

¹⁵ E.g., Farley 2008, 10.

¹⁶ Borowy 2009.

¹⁷ Lavelle 2005.

¹⁸ Farley 2008, 66-67.

¹⁹ See U.S. Bureau of the Census, available at www.usgovernmentspending.com.

²⁰ E.g., Bennett and Oliver 2002, 342; Abbot and Snidal 1998, 5.

²¹ Preston et al. 1989, 10.

²² New York Times 1981.

²³ Strange 1996.

²⁴ Slaughter 2004.

²⁵ E.g., Sartori 1969.

²⁶ Ideologies therefore differ from broader norms accepted by individuals across large societal segments, regardless of their political inclinations or whether they are top-level elites or not (Mullins 1972; Sartori 1969).

²⁷ The process we discuss here is different than the one where IGOs shape domestic ideational domestic environments, the reverse causal arrow. The latter process is not considered as truly affecting the developments discussed in this study, especially as we focus primarily on the role of powerful states that are generally considered to not be influenced by such IGO ideational pressures.

²⁸ See www.margarethatcher.org/document/107332.

²⁹ Indeed, the findings of cognitive dissonance theory have been incorporated by a number of fields and subfields beyond psychology, including that of foreign policy decision-making. See, e.g., Jervis 1976, 406.

³⁰ E. g., Allison 1969.

³¹ E.g., Downs 1966; Pfeffer 1997, 20.

³² Downs 1966, 9-22.

³³ Borowy 2009.

³⁴ For example, Henry Davison, chairman of American Red Cross (ARC) was the main proponent for establishing the nongovernmental LRCS (which he hoped would benefit ARC). See Howard-Jones 1978.

³⁵ Although, in some instances, the establishment of an IGO in one realm can bolster normative pressures to establish IGOs in other realms. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument.

³⁶ Medical Conference 1919, 13.

³⁷ Ibid, 53.

³⁸ Of course, there are a number of exceptions to this assumption. As our case study will show, there have been instances where smaller states also influence the degree of intergovernmentalism in global governance. This observation reflects the importance of pursuing further research to determine the conditions under which small states (and not just powerful ones) play a role in this process.

³⁹ E.g., Ruggie 1982; Keohane 1984; Burley 1993.

⁴⁰ The Dumbarton Oaks Conference also brought the Chinese and French into negotiations. However, their impact on the decision of *whether* to establish the UN was minimal.

⁴¹ As we consider power to be relevant when seeking to understand which states shape global governance, we also consider it relevant when studying their interactions. The average domestic activism of the relevant states is therefore weighted for their respective power.

⁴² However, as mentioned earlier, the present article focuses primarily on governments' decisions for greater intergovernmentalism or nongovernmentalism, acknowledging that nongovernmental actors' choices for such forms of global governance require an additional comprehensive study. We therefore control here only for the most important factors considered in the existing literature to affect nongovernmental actors' roles in the emergence of IGOs, our main outcome variable, rather than in their potentially more complex involvement in the overall processes leading towards greater intergovernmentalism or nongovernmentalism.

⁴³ E.g., Skjelsbaek 1971, 79 and 86.

⁴⁴ E.g., Tallberg et al. 2013.

⁴⁵ Indeed, virtually all nongovernmental actors, whether INGOs, private foundations, public-private hybrids, or businesses, are organizations.

⁴⁶ Cooley and Ron 2002.

⁴⁷ Abbott et al. 2016, 263; Andonova et al. 2017, 256.

⁴⁸ Abbott et al. 2015, 6; Johnson 2016.

⁴⁹ Abbott et al. 2016.

⁵⁰ E.g., Carpenter 2010.

⁵¹ Abbott et al. 2016, 260-261.

⁵² E.g., Shea 2016.

⁵³ Tallberg et al 2013.

⁵⁴ Like most cases, ours falls somewhere on a continuum between the two extremes of purely "most-likely" or "least-likely" (George and Bennett 2007, 122). However, due to the linkages between education and sovereignty, it can be viewed as falling closer to the "least-likely" end of that continuum.

⁵⁵ Davies 1943, 12.

⁵⁶ Rosello 1943, 206-208.

⁵⁷ Cummings 2008.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of Education 2010.

⁵⁹ International Bureau of Education 1926, 1-2.

⁶⁰ Renoliet 1999, 13. In contrast, the UN established its own university in 1973.

⁶¹ Ibid, 15. Author translation from French original.

⁶² League of Nations Council 1921, 14.

⁶³ Renoliet 1999, 16.

⁶⁴ It is noteworthy that the U.K. was represented in the Council by Lord Balfour, former Conservative Prime Minister.

⁶⁵ Davies 1943, 12.

⁶⁶ Renoillet 1999, 44.

⁶⁷ Talbott 2015, 97-104.

⁶⁸ Renoliet 1999, 49.

⁶⁹ Hofstetter 2015, 41.

⁷⁰ IBE 1929.

⁷¹ Hofstetter 2015, 43.

⁷² Mylonas 1976, 93.

⁷³ Sewell 1975, 37.

⁷⁴ Mylonas 1976, 111-112.

⁷⁵ Sewell 1975, 56.

⁷⁶ Sewell 1975, 63.

⁷⁷ The preamble reads: "That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." See http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

⁷⁸ Mylonas 1976, 217-218.

⁷⁹ Sewell 1975, 65-66; Mylonas 1976, 269-277.

⁸⁰ Mylonas 1976, 241.

⁸¹ Conference of Allied Ministers of Education 1945, 9-10.

⁸² UN Conference 1945.

⁸³ Sewell 1975, 67.

⁸⁴ Mylonas 1976, 396.

⁸⁵ Sewell 1975, 110.

⁸⁶ Hoggart 1978, 86.

⁸⁷ Preston et al. 1989, 11-14.

⁸⁸ Harries 1984.

⁸⁹ Cited in Preston et al. 1989, 173.

⁹⁰ While the underlying cause of American and British withdrawals may be the increasing Soviet and Third World influence in the organization, the strong neoliberal ideologies of the two governments in the 1980s can be understood as the immediate cause of the decisions.

⁹¹ Mundy 2010, 340.

⁹² Stiglitz 2002.

⁹³ UNESCO Executive Board 2012.

⁹⁴ Mundy 2010, 352.

⁹⁵ UNESCO, 2016. Voluntary funding, in turn, has become twice as great as regular government contributions to the IGO's budget.

⁹⁶ While the decision to establish (or not) IGOs was primarily driven by powerful states, in several instances smaller states also sought to influence the system. They were not successful in establishing an IGO for intellectual cooperation in 1921. They were more successful in their efforts to establish the nongovernmental IBE in 1926 and in promoting a more nongovernmental character for UNESCO in 1945.

⁹⁷ These findings, however, do not necessarily mean that the ideological mechanism was "more important" than the institutional one. After all, the most obvious instance in which the latter mechanism plays a role, immediately after World War II, was a crucial one that led to the establishment of a comprehensive (and fairly enduring) intergovernmental system of global governance

⁹⁸ Such analyses across issue-areas can only test the ideology-based argument. As mentioned, the institutions-based mechanism is expected to function narrowly, within a specific issue-area. One possible way to test the institution-based mechanism is to perform analyses assessing the impact of new domestic institutions on states establishing and joining IGOs *in one specific realm*. Yet, even if we were to generate data on domestic institutional developments in *one* issue-area (such as education), we cannot test the institutional argument through statistical analyses because the very small number of changes in the international realm (that is, the small number of new IGOs to emerge or of powerful states joining or leaving IGOs) would lead to serious problems of reliability.

⁹⁹ Union of International Associations, 2015.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., Shanks et al. 1996; Boli and Thomas 1999; Pevehouse et al. 2004.

¹⁰¹ The lack of data for medium and small states precludes us from developing tests that include more than the three most powerful states.

¹⁰² Singer et al. 1972. This measure takes into account multiple sources of power related to population, military capabilities and industrial output. Based on this dataset, the U.K., U.S., and China were usually the most powerful countries for 1867-1895; U.S., U.K., and Germany for 1896-1918; U.S., U.S.S.R., and Germany for most of 1919-1945; U.S., USSR, and China for most years since 1945. These countries sometimes switched positions among themselves. Also, there were a few years where some of these countries fell out of the top three slots while some of the others (and France) "moved up."

¹⁰³ See, discussion on OECD website (<https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm>); also Glenn 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Banks 2015. We imputed data (assuming linearity) for years where such data were missing.

¹⁰⁵ We rescaled the original variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

¹⁰⁶ E.g., Singer and Wallace 1970, 531; Krasner 1982, 499.

¹⁰⁷ In the models that include the two or three most powerful states we take into account the cumulative effect (i.e., the sum) of system-level factors such as conflict, interactions, and power.

¹⁰⁸ Sarkees and Wayman 2010.

¹⁰⁹ E.g., Keohane and Nye 2001; Boli and Thomas 1999.

¹¹⁰ Of all possible gauges of information flows we chose the total number of telephones (and cell phones) as it is relevant for virtually the entire period under consideration.

¹¹¹ Banks 2015.

¹¹² Singer and Wallace 1970.

¹¹³ Ruggie 1982; Keohane 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 250; Mansfield 1995; Wohlforth 1999.

¹¹⁴ Both the "Power" and "Interactions" variables were standardized in the same way we standardized our main explanatory variable.

¹¹⁵ Abbott et al. 2016

¹¹⁶ While our arguments apply to different types of nongovernmental actors, we use the number of INGOs (for which data are available) as a proxy for the spread of all existing nongovernmental actors.

¹¹⁷ E.g., Wallace and Singer 1970, 257.

¹¹⁸ We used robust standard errors as Cook-Weisberg tests show that the error terms are heteroskedastic.

¹¹⁹ Pevehouse et al. 2004.

¹²⁰ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

¹²¹ Marshall and Jagers 2002.

¹²² The decision to use country fixed effects rather than random effects was based on results of Hausman and Wald tests.

¹²³ The fact that the time period we select affects the impact of democracy or the number of existing IGOs but *not* of government activism, suggests that our main argument is based on powerful mechanisms that have been relevant across time, regardless of other important changes.

¹²⁴ E.g., Stiglitz 2002.

¹²⁵ Ruggie 1982.

¹²⁶ Boli and Thomas 1999.

Table 1: Government Activism and Establishment of IGOs

	Model 1.1 IGO emergence	Model 1.2 IGO emergence	Model 1.3 IGO emergence
Government activism of the most powerful state	9.072*** (2.381)		
Government activism of the two most powerful states		4.081** (1.390)	
Government activism of the three most powerful states			4.317** (1.315)
Conflict	0.630 (0.506)	-0.298* (0.126)	-0.262* (0.101)
Interactions	-6.332* (2.760)	-13.04*** (3.003)	-12.43*** (3.065)
New states	-0.342 (10.75)	0.643 (10.12)	2.568 (9.827)
Power	-2.909* (1.426)	-0.0444 (1.255)	0.885 (1.458)
IGOs	-0.157** (0.0513)	-0.0447 (0.0344)	-0.0263 (0.0301)
NGOs	0.0231*** (0.00659)	0.0124** (0.00468)	0.00993* (0.00426)
Constant	1.642 (2.992)	-2.591 (2.505)	-1.985 (2.861)
Observations	138	138	138
R-squared	0.574	0.679	0.715

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Prais-Winsten regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2: Government Activism and IGO Membership

	Model 2.1 (5-year change in IGO membership)	Model 2.2 (yearly change in IGO membership- after 1965)
Government activism of the three most powerful states	50.51*** (9.401)	7.671*** (1.525)
Conflict	-2.715 (3.071)	0.0791 (0.237)
Interactions	1.705 (7.556)	-0.326 (0.205)
Democracy	1.412 (2.678)	-4.124*** (1.010)
IGOs	-0.901** (0.300)	-0.00542 (0.0619)
Constant	72.40	11.69
Observations	89	102
R-squared	0.294	0.319

p<.01, *p<.001. Pooled time series cross sectional analysis with country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 1: Mechanisms Connecting Domestic Government Activism to Intergovernmentalism

